T. E. Lawrence and the Art of War in the 20-Offset Century

Posted on July thirteen, 2011
By George W. Gawrychl

If there were a hall of fame for mod military theorists, Thomas Edward Lawrence would deserve a place in it. In his dual office of theorist and practitioner of the fine art of war, Lawrence demonstrated the ability of military theory for developing appropriate strategy and tactics in war. In working effectively with the leaders of the Arab Revolt in World War I, he left insights for forging a successful coalition to defeat a common adversary. By embracing the Bedouin Arab fashion of war, he was able to develop a theory of guerrilla warfare that still holds relevance today. In light of the above achievements, Lawrence should stand as a model for military officers equally they prepare intellectually and emotionally to face up the challenges of the 20-first century.Ljohnpencil

Lawrence'south verbal role in the Arab Defection, it must be noted, remains a field of study of much controversy. Lawrence certainly has had his many detractors and skeptics. There is no denying, still, that Lawrence is worthy of commendation for his service in Arabia. Not only did he see extended combat in one of the harsher environments of the world, the Arabian desert, merely he conspicuously played an important role in a number of meaning military machine operations. For profitable the Arabs in capturing the port of Akaba in July 1917, for example, Lawrence received a promotion to the rank of major from the British Army and the Croix de Guerre avec palme et commendation a l'ordre de l'Armée from the French government. The Ottomans, for their part, offered a 5 thou pound reward on his head.

Overall, Lawrence did assist coordinate Arab armed forces operations with the British war endeavor confronting the Ottoman army in Palestine. Yet his exact achievements will e'er be subject for disagreement. But equally Jeremy Wilson, the leading British say-so on Lawrence, has noted: "After the war, young man officers who had seen his work at offset-paw said that his contributions had been outstanding. Although some of these witnesses may have exaggerated, others were men of high integrity. Their testimony cannot be entirely groundless." Whatever his exact role in the military operations, Lawrence proved a keen observer and a gifted writer. This is the legacy that concerns the states here.

Background

By the fourth dimension of his arrival in the Hejaz in October 1916, T. East. Lawrence was ready to carve for himself a place in modern armed forces history. At the age of fifteen or sixteen, Lawrence began reading books on military history and theory. He entered Jesus College at Oxford University in 1907 with a view of studying mod history. His passion for military subjects led him in 1909 to spend 4 months in Syrian arab republic and Lebanese republic conducting research on Crusader castles. After returning to England, he completed his bachelor thesis in 1910, entitled The Influence of the Crusades on European Military Compages—to the End of the XIIth Century, which was somewhen published as Crusader Castles. From 1910 to 1913, Lawrence conducted archaeological research in the Middle Eastward at Carchemish on the Upper Euphrates.

With war in Europe on the horizon, the British Ground forces enlisted his service in helping map the Sinai Peninsula, a project that resulted in the publication of a book entitled The Wilderness of Zin (1915). The fieldwork, conducted under the supervision of a regular British officer, exposed Lawrence to a systematic evaluation of the armed forces value of terrain.

The outbreak of Globe War I institute Lawrence fully engaged in London completing his study of the Sinai. Upon its completion, Lawrence joined the army as a lieutenant. Considering of his experience in the Middle East, inside a short time the British Army assigned him to its intelligence co-operative in Cairo. There he renewed his acquaintance with Gertrude Bell (1868–1926), whom he first met in May 1911. This Englishwoman came to Cairo to work in the British intelligence service considering of her extensive experience living and traveling in the Heart Due east. She proved an invaluable source for firsthand noesis of Arab tribes and tribal chiefs, no doubt providing Lawrence with useful insights into Bedouin society for his future assignment in Arabia. Her information complemented that which Lawrence had gained from his own readings on Arab history and society, including the famous work past Charles Montague Doughty (1843–1926), Travels in Arabia Deserta, originally published in 1888. Doughty has been regarded as the greatest of all English language travelers in Arabia, and he certainly commanded Lawrence's keen adoration.

Lawrence's assignment to the intelligence branch in Cairo proved an excellent final step in grooming for work amidst the Arabs. Here, for almost two years, Lawrence was able to amass "an encyclopaedic knowledge of the Ottoman Empire, and also of the Turkish ground forces and its dispositions. Each twenty-four hour period an immense amount of armed services and political information passed through his hands." This steady menstruation of information attuned Lawrence to the higher issues of warfare, the interplay of policy and armed services operations, especially showtime in August 1915 when Sherif Hussein, the emir of the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina, showtime offered the British an Arab alliance confronting the Ottomans.

By October 1916, Lawrence was well prepared for his assignment to Arabia. As a result of serious report, extensive travel, and several years of residence in the Centre East, Lawrence was proficient in the Standard arabic language. He also possessed an impressive cognition of Arab club, a knowledge that served him well in Arabia every bit a British liaison and advisor to the Arabs in revolt against Ottoman rule. His intelligence work gave him a good agreement of the strategic background for the British-Arab brotherhood. As a denizen-soldier, he found information technology easier to transcend the general conservatism of professional officers and to coordinate Arab military operations with the British campaign in Palestine and Syria. Well-read in military machine literature, Lawrence possessed the intellectual sophistication necessary to articulate his war machine experiences and observations into a coherent theory of irregular warfare. All this stands as no hateful accomplishment for even a regular officer.

Lawrence and Military Theory

When Lawrence landed in Jidda on October sixteen, 1916, the Arab Revolt was in full swing. Sherif Hussein, the emir of the Islamic holy cities of Mecca and Medina, had revolted, with British and French assistance, confronting Ottoman rule in Arabia. Arab tribes loyal to Hussein had already captured most of the Hejaz, including Mecca but non Medina. Hussein commanded his tribal armies through his four sons Abdullah, Feisal, Ali, and Zeid. Initially, British command in Cairo sent Lawrence to Arabia in order to gather intelligence on the revolt. Rather quickly, however, he gained the confidence of Sherif Feisal and remained in the Hejaz to serve every bit his British liaison.

In advising the Arabs, Lawrence came to appreciate the importance of armed forces theory, the power of placing nether 1 yoke intellect and action. Basil Liddell Hart, his most famous war machine biographer, claimed that "Every bit a boy T. Eastward. always idea that he was going to exercise peachy things, both 'active and cogitating'—'I hadn't learned y'all tin can't do both'—and determined to achieve both." Certainly by the time he reached Arabia, Lawrence realized that successful activeness demanded critical thought. Effective thinking, in plough, required an appropriate theory or philosophy of state of war. There in Arabia during Earth State of war I, Lawrence turned to war machine literature for understanding and guidance. His successful service in the Arab Revolt attests to the importance of theory for audio action in war.

Advising the Arabs demanded a sophisticated understanding of war. As a military counselor, Lawrence, now a captain, faced more a tactical problem. Politics and strategy weighed more heavily than tactics in such an assignment. Lawrence had to link the Bedouin style of warfare with the Allied goal of defeating the Ottoman army in Palestine and Syrian arab republic. This task required him to strike a harmony betwixt discordant interests and strategies, a formidable undertaking fifty-fifty for a regular officer. Even so Lawrence proved upwards to the task.

Fortunately, Lawrence possessed the intellectual background necessary for this piece of work. His studies in modern history included a solid foundation in both military machine history and military theory. "In military theory, I was tolerably read," Lawrence in one case remarked. This statement is quite minor, but his professional reading was impressive past the standards of any 24-hour interval. Indeed, he was familiar with the works of Clausewitz, Jomini, de Saxe, Moltke, du Picq, Guibert, von der Goltz, and Foch. These theorists were all noted for their insights into conventional warfare.

Sound military theory is essential for conducting war at a level higher than the tactical. Without it, officers must rely only on their own training, experiences, and intuition. Audio armed forces theory, on the other hand, develops the intellect. It provides an intellectual framework for analyzing the essence of war. It allows officers to analyze state of war in its various forms, such as conventional state of war, guerrilla warfare, civil state of war, or people'south war. It develops their critical thinking and judgment; officers acquire how to retrieve, rather than what to call up. This is exactly what Lawrence needed in his function of liaison to the Arab Revolt: a theoretical framework from which to comport a systematic analysis of his theater of operations.

Initially, Lawrence had little time to reverberate seriously and critically nigh his theater of operations. Upon arriving in the Hejaz, Lawrence saw "a crying demand for activeness," and so he uncritically relied too much on instinct in developing his initial courses of action. However, in March 1917, a combination of boils, dysentery, and malaria laid him up in a tent in Abdullah's military camp in Wadi Ais for some ten days. During this rather lengthy convalescence, Lawrence turned to serious thought and disquisitional analysis. He searched, in his own words, "for the equation between my book-reading and my movements." He sought to connect theory with practice, the abstract with the concrete. Only then could a compass be found with which to negotiate through the Bedouin world of warfare.

Maurice de Saxe (1696–1750) provided Lawrence the theoretical foundation for his own theory of guerrilla war. Writing nearly two centuries earlier, in 1732, de Saxe establish that generals were too preoccupied with tactics, marches, and formations and that they therefore ignored the intellectual aspects of war: "very few men occupy themselves with the higher issues of war. They laissez passer their lives drilling troops and believe that this is the simply branch of the military human action."fourteen Every bit a result of this preoccupation, these generals were neglecting disquisitional analysis of "the higher bug of war," including those of strategy and entrada planning. Like Lawrence, de Saxe had difficulty finding fourth dimension to dwell on these higher problems. And like Lawrence, de Saxe had to suffer illness to gain the time necessary for serious reflection and writing. During thirteen days of convalescence, de Saxe wrote My Reveries Upon the Acts of State of war, a treatise on state of war that remains a classic today. This work provided Lawrence with a theoretical framework for appreciating of the Bedouin way of war in Arabia.

Lawrence left his own body of military literature, maybe modest in quantity merely certainly impressive in quality. His Vii Pillars of Wisdom stands out amid all his writings. Unlike most armed forces memoirs, which are mainly a tape of personal challenges and triumphs, Seven Pillars of Wisdom can exist read every bit an insightful written report of Arab tribesmen and their manner of war. Lawrence too left for future generations of officers a significant article entitled "The Development of a Defection," published in 1919. In simply fifteen pages, Lawrence succinctly articulates his theory of guerrilla warfare, 1 that too appears in expanded class in Seven Pillars of Wisdom. In addition, in 1917, while in the midst of his assignment in Arabia, Lawrence filed "Twenty-Vii Articles," a written report in which he offered principles for working effectively with Arab Bedouins in coalition warfare. Together, these three writings institute excellent professional person reading for the intellectual evolution of officers, particularly in the art of irregular and coalition warfare.

The Usa Army should place a premium on military theory in the education of its officeholder corps. From a rubber distance, it appears to do so. "Know thyself and know thy enemy" goes the famous dictum in the profession of arms. The armed forces university at W Betoken, the staff college at Fort Leavenworth, and the state of war college in Carlisle Barracks stand up as august educational institutions with global reputations. The staff and war colleges are meant to set officers for the higher levels of state of war, and military theory should accept a prominent identify in the curriculum of both schools. A close examination of the United states of america Army, however, reveals a very different reality. American military machine culture enshrines technological superiority as the U.s.a. Regular army's magic bullet in warfare. Officers generally shun war machine theory, and the army values field experience over schooling in promotion of its officeholder corps. "Those who can't [control], teach" has been a popular attitude in the regular army. This anti-intellectual statement suggests a dichotomy between thought and action, a dichotomy that the best officers have ever sought to overcome.

The Vietnam War stands every bit a tragic example of this anti-intellectualism in the armed forces. Professor Douglas Expressway, a noted practiced of that conflict, evaluated the mental attitude of the United States military toward the Communist Vietnamese as "vincible ignorance": one does not know, one realizes one does not know, and notwithstanding one feels no need to modify the fact that one does not know. Freeway summarized the lack of critical idea thus: "No high-level permanent establishment was created to analyze enemy strategic thinking. . . .No significant biographical studies of enemy leaders were done. . . . One can search the voluminous Pentagon Papers in vain for extended discussions of the other side, any give-and-take at all. . . . Work on society of battle generally was good; politics of the Politburo was hardly touched." General Bruce Palmer, Vice Primary of Staff of the United States Army from 1968 to 1973, concurred with Thruway'due south cess: "Nonetheless, the truth is that the US was basically ignorant nigh the enemy's character and strategy" (my italics). According to this line of reasoning, the enemy was all tactics and no strategy, and American technology and idealism would defeat his national volition. No hard, critical, cogitating thinking was necessary. Rather, the quest for maintaining the initiative and seeking a decisive battle remained the holy grail of United States military operations. Superior technology would provide the means for victory.

Despite the tragedy of the Vietnam War, anti-intellectualism remains a function of American military civilisation today. The profession of arms in the United States is by and large not a reflective ane. In an commodity published in 1984, Huba Wass de Czege, then a colonel in the The states Army, underscored that American military culture encourages its officers to be doers rather than thinkers, disposing them to seek practical solutions to problems rather than rely on theoretical approaches to problem-solving. Practical knowledge and personal feel far outweigh the importance of military theory, and the latter is frequently viewed as too abstract to have any concrete value. In direct response to this general mental attitude in the United States Regular army, Wass de Czege, who eventually rose to the rank of brigadier general, argued that military machine theory should serve every bit a foundation for coming together the challenges of reform and innovation.

Little has changed in the United States Ground forces since the publication of Wass de Czege's article some sixteen years ago. Personally, with each passing year at the Us Army Command and General Staff Higher (at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas), I am more than and more surprised at the general lack of serious reflection or analysis by individual officers or by the larger military institution on how the Usa War machine, together with its allies, defeated the Iraqi army in the Gulf State of war. In fact, today, the United states Army is too busy integrating new technologies into its force structure in preparation for its next major war to encourage critical examination of how the Gulf State of war experience might unconsciously be shaping that preparation. Critical introspection suffers every bit a consequence of a heavy reliance on engineering for solving military challenges in the futurity.

Lawrence's service in Arabia, all the same, stands in sharp contrast to the general bias against military theory in American military civilization. Lawrence demonstrated the importance of linking theory to do. His insights into the nature of guerrilla and coalition warfare warrant serious consideration.

War machine Theory of Irregular Warfare

To aid him fulfill his mission in Arabia, Lawrence had to appreciate the Arab way of war. Every bit underscored past Clausewitz well-nigh a century earlier, "The first, the supreme, the about far-reaching deed of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to found . . . the kind of war on which they are embarking, neither making it for, not trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature. This is the start of all strategic questions and the most comprehensive." Lawrence fulfilled this need admirably.

Warfare falls into two broad categories: conventional and unconventional. Conventional warfare refers to wars fought between regular armies in traditional battles, with the master military objective being either to defeat the adversary'due south army or to seize and concur strategic terrain. To ensure victory in conventional war, commanders are expected to bring large forces together in mass and firepower in club to defeat an opponent's ground forces. Battle becomes the centerpiece of strategy and tactics. Unconventional warfare, on the other paw, refers to irregular warfare, people's wars, or guerrilla warfare. This kind of state of war requires a very different mindset and very different tactics and strategy. Irregular forces lack the men and cloth to engage a regular regular army in a major battle, and therefore they resort to a strategy of defeating small parts of the main army, most often with hitting and run tactics. Bedouin Arabs were centuries-old practitioners of guerrilla warfare.

To attain success in Arabia, Lawrence needed to understand the nature of guerrilla warfare. Here, he came to embrace de Saxe as his war machine mentor. Lawrence regarded the eighteenth-century Austrian general and theorist as "the greatest primary of this kind of state of war." De Saxe offered a theory of war based on the model of a full general who good the dictum that "a war might be won without fighting battles." Whether Lawrence was enlightened of this or not, others had presented a similar platonic. Some 2,500 years earlier, Sun Tzu, the nigh famous Chinese theorist of state of war, wrote that "the highest excellence is to subdue the enemy'due south regular army without fighting at all." Past arguing for a military strategy based on maneuver without battle, de Saxe provided Lawrence with a theoretical framework for negotiating the Arab world of war with purpose and direction.

Lawrence could see directly application of de Saxe'southward theory of avoidance of battle to the unconventional warfare of Arabia in the twentieth century. In Bedouin gild, battle carried an importance markedly different from that of European mass armies waging war on the continent. The Bedouin generally nurtured a sensitivity to loftier casualties. Europe'southward bloody battles of World War I waged over weeks or months made no sense in an environs where the population was scarce, the desert vast, and the organization tribal. In Arabia, seizing fertile ground, maintaining personal accolade, or capturing prize booty often carried more weight in developing military strategy than the conventional aim of defeating an army in bloody engagements.

De Saxe's theory of war without battle as a centerpiece of military strategy gave Lawrence a theoretical base from which to analyze and appreciate the Bedouin way of state of war. Inspired by de Saxe, Lawrence developed his own concept of a "state of war of disengagement." Avert seeking the enemy's strength in battle; instead, conduct a strategy based on raids by 100 to 200 tribesmen against targets designed to unbalance the adversary. "Our tactics were always tip and run, non pushes, only strokes." To deny the Turks lucrative targets, the Arabs naturally resorted to the principle of employing "the smallest force, in the quickest time, at the farthest place." In other words, the Arab strength lay in employing a raiding strategy. Boxing should exist engaged simply under the most favorable conditions. This was the essence of Bedouin warfare.

The primary elements in Lawrence's theory of irregular warfare may seem obvious and uncomplicated today. In his day, Lawrence experienced an institutional bias in the British Ground forces toward conventional strategy and tactics: "We all looked simply to the regulars to win the war. We were obsessed past the dictum of Foch that the ethic of mod state of war is to seek for the enemy's army, his heart of power, and destroy it in boxing." Although Sherif Hussein wanted European weapons and technicians to help him defeat the Ottoman army at Medina in a major battle, the Bedouin Arabs couldn't be transformed into a Western regular army. They rejected formal discipline and the training programs designed to interruption individuality for the purpose of forming cohesive combat units. Instead, the tribes preferred to fight under their ain sheikhs as individual warriors and every bit members of tribes. Even an adept Arab leader such every bit Feisal could not easily mix tribes together. And when Arab regular units were imported from Egypt, Syria, or Iraq, tensions between them and the tribes often hampered military operations.

Lawrence understood these limitations and was frustrated by them at times. In August 1917, afterward the capture of Akaba by the Arabs, he wrote in a alphabetic character to Clayton: "Of course it would exist dainty and much simpler for us if the Arab Movement emerged from the bluff-and-mountain pass phase, and get a calculable military machine problem: but it hasn't nevertheless, and isn't likely to." Despite all the Arab military weaknesses, Lawrence however found much to be admired in the Bedouin fashion of war: "Do not try to trade on what you know of fighting. The Hejaz confounds ordinary tactics. Acquire the Bedu principles of state of war every bit thoroughly and as quickly as you can, for till yous know them your communication volition be no good to the Sherif. Unnumbered generations of tribal raids have taught them more nigh some parts of the business concern than nosotros will ever know." Where others focused on Arab weaknesses, Lawrence saw, in the words of General Palmer, "character and strategy" among the Bedouins.

In developing his own theory of irregular warfare, Lawrence identified 3 key elements for assay: the algebraic, the biological, and the psychological. In understanding the coaction of these 3 elements, he was able to appreciate the strategy and tactics that would allow the Arabs to play a complementary role in the British effort to defeat the Ottoman army in Palestine and Syrian arab republic. A careful reading of his short assay helps officers sharpen their own analytical skills.

"The algebraic element of things" refers to the physical environment that has shaped warfare in the Hejaz. For Lawrence, this was the decisive chemical element. Here state of war is part science, depending on mathematical calculations with which to analyze the fixed condition of time, space, and terrain. Using simple math, Lawrence calculated the size of territory held by the Arabs in relation to the number of Ottoman troops in theater. The Ottomans, with only sixteen,000 troops in Arabia and with a shortage of staunch Arab allies amid the tribes, lacked enough soldiers in order to plant effective control over 140,000 square miles of territory. Geography, the vast desert, gave the Arab Revolt sanctuaries that the Ottomans could non seize and concur for any length of time. As noted by Lawrence, "to make state of war upon rebellion is messy and tiresome, like eating soup with a pocketknife." The Arabs possessed safety havens in the vast desert and therefore had the fourth dimension to conduct a protracted struggle. They received critical assistance from the British Army, an regular army that posed a serious threat to Palestine. Consequently, the Ottoman High Control felt it could ill afford to spare additional troops to quell the Arab insurgence. Strange assist and a distracted enemy proved a window of opportunity for the rebellious Arabs.

Lawrence was correct in his systematic analysis. Safe havens, foreign help, and an undermanned opponent are important factors in helping an insurrection achieve success. The Vietnamese communists used safe havens in Laos, Cambodia, and North Vietnam to defeat the United States; the Afghans, for their part, relied on Pakistan and the mountainous terrain of Transitional islamic state of afghanistan to place a nail in the Soviet bury. In each case, one superpower provided vital assistance to a smaller ally to help defeat the rival superpower.

Moreover, both the The states and the Soviet Marriage limited their war efforts. Each, for instance, set limits on its troop levels then as to not overstrain the home front. Neither superpower, therefore, committed enough troops to secure the countryside. By placing major constraints on themselves, both superpowers played to the enemy strengths based on geography, time, and will. Meanwhile, both the Vietnamese and the Afghans were committed to total state of war and thus were willing to engage in encarmine battles.

After analyzing geography, Lawrence next addressed the homo dimensions of warfare, which he called "the biological chemical element of lives." Here, war is function art, for human beings are involved in waging information technology. Intangibles such every bit genius, fear, heroism, and morale lay outside the domain of quantitative analysis. The irrational exerts its own powerful influence over military operations. Biologically speaking, Arab tribesmen were masters of the raid, capable of employing strategic mobility across vast stretches of desert. Even so, different the Vietnamese or the Afghans, the Bedouins were disinclined to wage bloody battles with heavy casualties in a total war effort.

Yet the art of war includes both the human and the textile. The Ottoman Empire was beset with economic woes and then that, according to Lawrence, the loss of material proved a greater drain on resources than the loss of soldiers. The Arabs could plough the Ottoman fabric weakness into their own strength. Without a heavy reliance on a base of operations for logistics, Bedouin warriors could easily disappear into the vast desert, only to appear suddenly elsewhere to destroy a bridge, cutting the railway, seize a supply train, or overrun an outpost. In a bolder move, the Arabs could, through a strategic maneuver, suddenly attack and defeat an Ottoman garrison. Such was the case when, much to the surprise of the British, slightly over five hundred Arabs seized Akaba on July six, 1917, after having traversed inhospitable desert to set on the port city from an unexpected direction. The Arabs could movement with stealth through the desert, appearing at the advisable fourth dimension for an assail. The result was, in the words of Lawrence, "a vapor, blowing where we listed." Strategic mobility was an Arab forcefulness, offsetting their weakness in sustaining casualties. "Our cards were speed and time, not hitting power, and these gave us strategical rather than tactical force. Range is more to strategy than force."

But against what specific target or targets should these raids focus? In Cairo, Lawrence had spent much of his time analyzing the Ottoman regular army in Arabia. Initially, he viewed Medina as the locus of Ottoman military power whose conquest would give Sherif Hussein a decisive victory. But a well-entrenched Ottoman garrison defended the second holiest urban center in Islam, and the Arabs lacked the conventional power and will to seize this prize at a cost of heavy man loss. Afterward the Ottomans failed to take Rabegh en road to capture Mecca, Lawrence and the Arabs captured Wejh, a small town some two hundred miles north of Rabegh. From here, the rebellious Arabs posed a straight threat to the Hejaz Railway, the only communication and supply link between the Ottoman garrison at Medina and Palestine. Some five hundred miles of railway separated Medina from Ma'an in Transjordan. The Hejaz Railway thus served every bit the lifeline of the Ottoman army in Arabia, a lifeline vulnerable to attack.

In order to protect his simply line of advice, the Ottoman commander had to divide his forcefulness in two, one to protect Medina and the 2d to guard the railway. Past this decision, he finer lost a maneuver strength to claiming the Arab tribes with offensive operations. The desert thus became an fifty-fifty greater sanctuary for the Arabs as the strategic initiative at present clearly passed to Sherif Hussein. As Lawrence noted at this juncture of the state of war endeavor, "peradventure the virtue of irregulars lay in depth, not in face." The mere threat to the railway, backed by sporadic raids, was enough to pivot downwards some sixteen thousand Ottoman troops in Arabia. The Ottomans saw their military ability immobilized as they placed their main endeavour on defending Medina and the railway. The Ottoman garrison at Medina held out until the end of the war, left to wither on the vine of the Hejaz Railway.

Finally, the third chemical element in Lawrence's military theory was "the psychological chemical element of ideas." Initially, Lawrence failed to grasp this dimension: "I had not seen that the preaching was victory and the fighting a delusion . . . as Feisal fortunately liked changing men'southward minds rather than breaking railways, the preaching went better." Hither was the imperative of gaining and maintaining legitimacy for a rebellion through spreading the word. The use of forcefulness or threats to convince tribes could lead but to internecine tribal warfare. Propaganda, whenever appropriate, was a more constructive tool. According to Lawrence, psychological warfare had to target three chief audiences: one'due south own troops, those of the enemy, and the noncombatant population, in this instance the townspeople and the tribes. Their guerrilla warfare had to be presented as a struggle based on a noble crusade: Arab independence from Turkish dominion. Propaganda helped forward the Arab Revolt; the press printing served as a useful instrument in this regard. Today, CNN and the Internet take replaced the press press, but the nature of the trouble is much the same. In a rebellion, ideas are important in the quest for legitimacy and loyalty.

In irregular warfare, the importance of national will, or, in this case, tribal opinion, is hard to exaggerate. Lawrence thus came to sympathize and appreciate the importance of this psychological element. After all, state of war is a social phenomenon, and irregular warfare takes on the dimension of a struggle for the hearts and minds of the people. Lawrence, however, was under no illusions. He understood that the Bedouin tribes were oftentimes won over to the cause non so much by words equally by the coin provided past the British to the tribal chiefs. Primary loyalty remained with the tribe, and its commonage action could oftentimes exist bought for a price.

In developing his theory of irregular warfare, Lawrence embraced the Bedouin globe dissimilar his peers. The tribes taught him much about warfare in the desert. He came to understand the limited nature of his conflict and avoided trying to transform the Arab Defection into something alien to its nature. He learned to appreciate the interaction of the cloth, the human, and ideas in such warfare. He gave proper attention to the factors of rubber havens, foreign assistance, a dispersed enemy, and a friendly population. In the end, Lawrence proved quite successful in articulating the essential features of guerrilla warfare.

Coalition Warfare

Truthful to his desire to ally action and contemplation, Lawrence gave serious thought to his mission inside a British-Arab coalition. He came to adore the Bedouin warriors and recognized their character and strategy. Many British officers, nevertheless, failed to share his adoration for the Bedouin and instead affected a superior attitude and behavior. Others were willing to learn, but needed instruction. To accost this general problem, Lawrence felt compelled to offer advice on bridging the cultural gap between the British world and that of Arabia. In his "Twenty-Vii Manufactures," he offered practical wisdom for those British officers assigned to Arabia. He published this report a month and a one-half after the Arabs had captured Akaba. The underlining bulletin was quite clear: the Bedouins were worthy of admiration for their unique fashion of war. Despite particular circumstances, many of his principles for dealing with the Bedouin serve as excellent communication for officers assigned to work in whatever coalition.

In his report, Lawrence underscored the necessity of openness and flexibility. His introduction cautioned that "treatment Hejaz Arabs is an art non a scientific discipline, with exceptions and no obvious rules." One could brand the same argument for whatsoever coalition partner. There are no easy answers or shortcuts to gaining an understanding of a strange club. To be effective in Bedouin society involved acquiring as much information every bit possible about the region's leaders and the tribes themselves. Near the end of the report, he emphasized that "the beginning and catastrophe of handling Arabs is unremitting report of them. . . . Your success will be just proportional to the corporeality of mental effort you devote to it." In conducting his own intelligence assessments, Lawrence stressed the importance of learning power relationships among the Bedouins. British officers, for instance, had to appreciate the deviation betwixt a sherif and a sheikh in Bedouin lodge. And Lawrence remained truthful to his ain advice. Equally late equally June 1918, he was hard at work gathering and analyzing fabric on the political loyalties and history of the northern tribes as the Arab Defection moved north from Akaba to Damascus. Military commanders generally do non seek such knowledge, though publicly all would champion its value. Over eighty years later, for example, General Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of Western forces in Operation Desert Storm, would fall brusque on this score. Khaled bin Sultan, who allowable the Arab coalition in the Gulf War, wrote of the American general: "the people, the leading personalities of Arab politics, the families, the customs, attitudes, language, history, religion, way of life—indeed all the complexities of our Arab world—were as foreign and unfamiliar to him every bit they are to the average American." As commander of United States Primal Control responsible for the Eye East, Schwarzkopf should have possessed some depth of knowledge on these subjects, at least enough to impress his Arab hosts. But in this regard, he failed.

In addition to cultural knowledge, Lawrence argued for a proper mental attitude toward ane's ally in order to avert unnecessary friction and problems. He counseled patience, respect, tact, and even a skilful dose of humility. The foreign officer had to take time to ingratiate himself into the inner circle of a tribe in order to gain its trust. He had to resist the temptation to requite orders or to seek the spotlight at the expense of his hosts. Tribes would naturally resist following foreigners, and it took try and skill to take them coordinate their military machine activeness with that of a Christian nation. To help maintain the coalition, Lawrence advised the sharing of glories with an marry, if at all possible: "Strengthen his prestige at your expense before others if you tin." He championed common courtesy in dealings with the Arab: "If we are tactful, we can at once retain his goodwill and carry out our job." Writing years subsequently, Khaled bin Sultan unknowingly confirmed much of Lawrence'south advice. The Saudi general institute some fault with Schwarzkopf'due south attitude and behavior in dealing with Arabs during Desert Shield and Desert Tempest: "I believe he never fully grasped my overriding concern to ensure that we did nothing during the war that might compromise out postwar future." For instance, there could exist no hint that Saudi sovereignty was in any way compromised in deference to American power. As Khaled noted, "My public appearance every bit the Saudi commander had to be as impressive as his, down to the smallest detail." Meetings between the ii commanders, for example, had to take place in Khaled'southward office. Schwarzkopf could non accept more bodyguards or vehicles in his entourage than those possessed by his Saudi counterpart. Such seemingly little things mattered much to the Saudis. They were securely concerned about legitimacy of the Saudi regime, which already had been compromised, to some degree, by the rex inviting Western troops into his country. Had Schwarzkopf read Lawrence'southward "Twenty-Seven Manufactures," he would have better prepared for dealing with Saudi leaders.

No doubt, many of Lawrence'due south insights into the nature of coalition warfare derived from directly observation. Feisal was attempting to organize a coalition of Arab tribes that failed to see themselves as a single nation. Tribal chiefs guarded their independence fervently. In reality, Feisal lacked unity of command. Rather, he commanded by the consent of the Bedouin tribal chiefs. In such a delicate coalition of Arab tribesmen, Feisal had to exist more of a diplomat than a commander. He had to be careful not to amerce tribal leaders with orders only rather to coordinate military operations through verbal persuasion, often laced with monetary and material incentives. He was, in fact, attempting to lay the foundations for a future land as well as waging a state of war against the Ottomans. Maintaining this all-important coalition proved his main effort.

Arab tribesmen expected Feisal to play the traditional role of tribal sheikh. In this regard, Lawrence merely depicted his patron as that ideal. According to Lawrence, Feisal gave admission to all, never cut curt petitions, showed farthermost patience and cocky-control, demonstrated goodwill and humour, and exhibited tact by never allowing anyone to leave his presence "dissatisfied or hurt." Cynics and skeptics have criticized Lawrence as a Western imperialist who portrayed Feisal as a "noble savage." Yet Lawrence's description conformed to the tribal leader idealized past the Bedouins themselves. Moreover, this style of leadership makes sense in coalition warfare. Dwight D. Eisenhower proficient information technology to some degree every bit supreme Allied commander in Europe during World War Ii. He, for example, demanded collegiality and courtesy from subordinates and staff, tried to reach decisions by consensus, and devoted nearly of his time to coalition politics. To avoid unnecessary friction, American soldiers received a booklet instructing them on British customs and habits. For demanding deference to the British, Eisenhower received criticism from boyfriend Americans for catering, in some instances, to the British at the expense of the Americans.

Lawrence approached his consignment with a mindset similar to that of Eisenhower in Globe State of war II. He besides stressed flexibility, adaptability, and collegiality in dealing with the Bedouin. His guidelines, however brief and focused on Bedouin society, remain a valuable source for addressing proper attitude and beliefs in any coalition. National arrogance and cultural insensitivity remain sources of friction and animosity in whatsoever multinational war or peace back up operation. American officers, as they study the nature of coalition warfare, should give serious idea to Lawrence'south insights on the subject.

Study of Lawrence's military career in Arabia does indicate to i major claiming in coalition warfare: competing interests amidst allies. On this score, Lawrence plant himself serving two masters. He represented British interests to the Bedouins but also attempted to champion the crusade of Arab independence, especially as the rebellion moved n toward Damascus and, afterward the war, in the peace negotiations in Paris. Lawrence felt duplicitous for his part in negotiating the labyrinth where these two worlds—British and Arab—intersected politically and militarily. The effort left Lawrence with guilt. He came to believe that he had failed the Arabs. American officers might learn from Lawrence that they must be prepared to strike a harmony between competing interests in multinational operations. The stakes are always high, and they are often personal as well as political.

Conclusion

Much to his credit, Lawrence demonstrated the importance of military theory in warfare. Officers today should study his career and writings for the ways in which they challenge the profession of arms.

First, officers should set bated time for serious reflection on their profession, and war machine theory is an important tool in this endeavour. Reading the military machine classics is essential for intellectual development in peacetime. 2d, coalitions, whether in war or peace support operations, will remain a characteristic of the United States' military deployments in the hereafter. Lawrence offered some necessary principles and guidelines that are indispensable for officers who are assigned to work with an centrolineal army.

Third, officers should study Lawrence's theory of guerrilla warfare and the way he arrived at it. As the only superpower left after the Cold War, the Us Army continues to focus its main effort on preparing for conventional warfare. Currently, however, peace support operations blot much of the army's time and resources, and the military machine establishment rather reluctantly embarks on these missions. Meanwhile, regular army education devotes little attention to unconventional warfare. In preparing for the challenges of the twenty-first century, the U.s.a. Regular army must educate its officers in the entire spectrum of conflict, from global state of war to peacekeeping. It tin ill afford to be selective in its preparations. For his part, Lawrence offers a military theory that effectively addresses guerrilla warfare, that role of spectrum between conventional wars and peace support operations.

Regardless of the controversies about his personal life, Lawrence stands a model of the importance of wedding ceremony theory and practice in warfare. The United States Army relies too heavily on technological superiority to compensate for the anti-intellectualism of its war machine culture. Lawrence'due south war machine career in World War I attests to the importance of intellectual preparation of officers. The twenty-kickoff century promises to take many surprises across the spectrum of conflict. Studying Lawrence will help prepare American officers for the unexpected challenges of the profession of arms in the futurity.

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Excerpted fromThe Waking Dream of T. E. Lawrence: Essays on His Life, Literature, and Legacy byCharles Thou. Stang.

Copyright © 2002 by the author and reprinted by permission of Palgrave Macmillan.

Tags: Lawrence of Arabia, T. East. Lawrence